The decisive influence on the shaping of the organization and tactics of the German infantry before the outbreak of World War II was, on the one hand, the experience of the previous World War, but also theoretical works created in the 1920s and 1930s, which often emphasized the need to perceive the German infantry as a tool waging an offensive war. This affected both the equipment and the organization of the German infantry division, which during the September campaign of 1939 consisted of 3 infantry regiments, each of which was divided into 3 infantry battalions, an artillery company and an anti-tank company. In addition, there were numerous support units, including: an artillery regiment with 4 artillery squadrons (including one heavy), an anti-tank battalion, a sapper battalion and a communications battalion. In total, the so-called infantry division In the first mobilization wave, there were approximately 17,700 people and had a significant artillery component, but also was abundantly equipped with machine guns. It also had modern and efficient - for those times - means of communication and command. In the course of the war, infantry divisions underwent transformation - in 1943 some of them were transformed into armored grenadier divisions. However, from 1943, the standard division of the "traditional" infantry consisted of approx. 12,500 men (and not approx. 17,700 as in 1939), and its artillery component - especially heavy artillery - was also reduced in it, while its anti-tank defense was significantly improved. It is assumed that during the entire Second World War, about 350 infantry divisions served in the Wehrmacht.
The French army, joining the Second World War, was prepared and trained on the basis of the experiences resulting mainly from the Great War. Thus, it adhered to the defensive doctrine of war, which placed particular emphasis on the methodical preparation of operations, their careful planning, as well as ensuring the strongest possible artillery support. In this doctrine, armored weapons were perceived as support for infantry units, which was reflected in the French armored structures of that time - they focused primarily on thick armor, possibly strong armament, and maneuverability was treated rather of secondary importance. A great example is the Char B1 bis or Somua S-35 tanks. Fatal communication in French tanks turned out to be a big problem, as it was clearly inferior to the solutions used in the German army. A serious drawback in the period 1939-1940 was also the dispersion of the French armored forces among infantry divisions, and although statistically the French army had many more tanks than the Wehrmacht, it deployed fewer mechanized and armored divisions. Moreover, their organization and structure were inferior to those used in the German army.