In the 1920s and - especially - in the 1930s, the Red Army underwent a rapid development in terms of increasing its posts, as well as increasing saturation with technical weapons, primarily armored weapons. Still, the infantry was the primary and numerically largest element of the Red Army. The intensive quantitative development of this type of weapon began at the turn of 1929/1930. In 1939, even before the aggression against Poland, the Soviet infantry was formed into 173 divisions (so-called rifle divisions), most of which were grouped in 43 corps. It is worth adding that after the September campaign in 1939, this number increased even more. The Soviet rifle division in 1941 consisted of three rifle regiments (three battalions each), an artillery regiment, after an anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery division, as well as reconnaissance and communication battalions. In total, it numbered about 14,500 people. However, by 1945 this position underwent significant changes, leading to a division of approximately 11,500-12,000 people, consisting of three infantry regiments, an artillery brigade consisting of three regiments, a self-propelled artillery squadron and many support units, including anti-tank, anti-aircraft weapons or communications. The saturation of infantry units with machine weapons has also increased significantly - for example with the submachine guns APsZ 41, and later APsZ 43.
Armored and mechanized troops of the Red Army began to be formed on a larger scale in the late 1920s and 1930s. Especially in the 1930s they developed dynamically. This was reflected both in the organizational structure and in the equipment. On the first of these planes, the formation of mechanized corps began in 1932, the structure of which evolved until the outbreak of World War II. As for the equipment - new types of tanks were introduced, such as the BT-5, BT-7, T-26 and the T-28 multi-turret tank. Very successful tanks also introduced into the line shortly before the start of the war with the Third Reich - of course, we are talking about the KW-1 and T-34. However, despite the fact that at the time of the German aggression, the Soviet armored forces had a quantitative advantage over the aggressor, they suffered huge losses in men and equipment in the first period of the war. They can be explained by the shortcomings of a well-trained officer cadre (the aftermath of the Stalinist purges of the 1930s), worse individual training of Soviet tankers compared to their German opponents, or inferior tactics used by the crews of Soviet tanks. Also, the doctrine of their use was not as consistent and well-grounded in training as in the German army. We can also add to this the rather poor ergonomics of Soviet vehicles or the shortage of short and long-range radio stations in armored forces. With time, however, these errors began to be more or less successfully corrected. For example - from the spring of 1942, armored armies began to be formed, which were to perform primarily offensive tasks and which constituted a slightly more ergonomic structure than the previous mechanized corps. However, it seems reasonable to say that until the end of the war, the Red Army emphasized the quantitative advantage rather than the qualitative advantage over the enemy, although it introduced such successful tanks as the T-34/85 or IS-2 into service during the warfare. This is clearly visible, for example, during the Battle of Kursk in July 1943.